Abstract. A commonly employed abstraction for studying the object placement problem for the purpose of Internet content distribution is that of a distributed replication group. In this work the initial model of distributed replication group of Leff, Wolf, and Yu (IEEE TPDS '93) is extended to the case that individual nodes act selfishly, i.e., cater to the optimization of their individual local utilities. Our main contribution is the derivation of equilibrium object placement strategies that: (a) can guarantee improved local utilities for all nodes concurrently as compared to the corresponding local utilities under greedy local object placement; (b) do not suffer from potential mistreatment problems, inherent to centralized strategies that aim at optimizing the social utility; (c) do not require the existence of complete information at all nodes. We develop a baseline computationally efficient algorithm for obtaining the aforementioned equilibrium strategies and then extend it to improve its performance with respect to fairness. Both algorithms are realizable in practice through a distributed protocol that requires only limited exchange of information.
All the aforementioned work has focused on the optimization of the so called social utility (sum of the individual local utilities of the nodes, defined as the delay and bandwidth gains from employing replication). Optimizing the social utility is naturally the objective in environments where a central authority dictates its replication decisions to the nodes. It suits well applications such as web mirroring and CDNs, which are operated centrally by a single authority (this being the content creator or the content distributor). Applications that are run by multiple authorities, such as web caching networks and P2P networks, may also seek to optimize the social utility. This, however, requires some nodes to act in a spirit of voluntaryism, as the optimization of the social utility is often harmful to several local utilities.
Consider as an example a group of nodes that collectively replicate content. If one of the nodes generates the majority of the requests, then a socially optimal (SO) object placement strategy will use the storage capacity of other nodes to replicate objects that do not fit in the over-active node's cache. Consequently, the users of these other nodes will experience a service deterioration as a result of their storage being hijacked by potentially irrelevant objects with regard to their local demand. In fact, such nodes would be better served if they acted independently and employed a greedy local (GL) object placement strategy (i.e., replicated the most popular objects according to the local demand). A similar situation can arise if caching, rather that replication, is in place: remote hits originating from other nodes may evict objects of local interest in an LRU-operated cache that participates in a web caching network. Concern for such exploitation can prevent rational nodes from participating in such groups, and, instead, lead them to operating in isolation in a greedy local manner. Such a behavior, however, is far from being desirable.
Being GL is often ineffective in terms of performance, not only with respect to the social utility, but with respect to the individual local utilities too. For example, when the nodes have similar demand patterns and the inter-node distances are small, then replicating multiple times the same most popular objects, as done by the same repeated GL placement at all the nodes, is highly ineffective. Clearly, all the nodes may gain substantially in this case, if they cooperate and replicate different objects. In fact, it is even possible that an appropriate cooperation of the nodes can lead to a simultaneous improvement of all local utilities as compared to the GL performance. However, nodes cannot recognize such opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation, since they are generally unaware of the remote demand patterns. On the other hand, they cannot know the impact (bad or good) that the SO object placement strategy may have on their own local utility.
To address the above mentioned deadlock, we use as reference the object replication problem defined by Leff et al. [1] , and extend it to account for the existence of selfishly motivated nodes. We use a strategic game in normal form [8] to model the contention between the selfish nodes and set out to identify pure Nash equilibrium object placement strategies (henceforth abbreviated EQ). There are several advantages in employing EQ strategies. First, by their definition, they can guarantee for each and every node of the group that its local utility under EQ will be at least as good as under GL, and possibly better. The first case ("at least as good") precludes mistreatment problems such as those that can arise under the SO placement which cause the nodes to leave the group in pursuit of GL placement. The second case ("possibly better") is the typical one, and points to the fact that implicit cooperation is induced even by selfishly behaving nodes as they attempt to do better than GL. Consequently, the EQ strategy is in position to break the above mentioned deadlock, as it forbids the mistreatment of any one node, while it also guards against the disintegration of the group, and the poor performance associated with the GL strategy.
Our main result is that such EQ object placement strategies can be obtained by simple distributed algorithms that do not require the existence of complete information at all the nodes. We describe a two-step local search (TSLS) algorithm for this purpose. TSLS requires each node to know only its local demand pattern and the objects selected for replication by remote nodes, but not the remote demand patterns of other nodes (the demand pattern of a node defines explicitly its utility function, thus in the presented framework it is not assumed that nodes know the utility functions of other nodes). Knowing the remote demand patterns requires the transmission of too much information and thus is seldom possible in large distributed replication groups. On the other hand, knowing the objects selected for replication by remote nodes requires the exchange of much less information, which can be reduced further by employing simple encoding schemes such as Bloom filters [9] (see also [10] for real distributed applications/protocols that utilize such information). Thus in terms of the required information, the proposed EQ strategies fit between the GL strategy that requires only local information, and the SO strategy that requires complete information.
A recent work on game theoretic aspects of caching and replication that is relevant to our work is due to Chun et al. [11] . However, this work does not consider storage capacity limits on the nodes and, thus, differs substantially from our approach.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes formally the distributed replication group and the distributed selfish replication (DSR) game. Section 3 describes the baseline TSLS object placement algorithm. Section 4 establishes that the TSLS algorithm produces a pure Nash equilibrium object placement strategy for the DSR game. Section 5 is devoted to the presentation of the TSLS(k) algorithm, whose development is largely motivated by our desire to obtain EQ placements without having to resort to the logical ordering of the nodes. Section 6 describes a distributed protocol for implementing the two algorithms. Section 7 presents some numerical examples. Finally, Section 8 concludes the article. The omitted proofs for the presented Propositions, as well as implementation details and more numerical results, can be found in a longer version of this article [12] .
Definitions
Let o i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and v j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, denote the ith unit-sized object and jth node, and let O = {o 1 , . . . , o N } and V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } denote the corresponding sets. Node v j is assumed to have a storage capacity for C j unit-sized objects and a demand described by a rate vector r j over O, r j = {r 1j , . . . , r N j }, where r ij denotes the rate (requests per second) at which node v j requests object o i ; let also ρ j = oi∈O r ij denote the total request rate from v j . We follow the access cost model defined in [1] and according to which, accessing an object from a node's local cache costs t l , from a remote node's cache t r , and from the origin server t s , with t l ≤ t r ≤ t s (Fig. 1 depicts the envisaged distributed replication group).
Let R j = {o i ∈ O : r ij > 0} denote the request set of node v j . Let P j denote the placement of node v j , that is the set of objects replicated at this node; P j ⊆ O OS tr ts rij vj
Step 0 (initialization): and |P j | = C j . Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } be referred to as a global placement and let
. . ∪ P n denote the set of objects collectively held by nodes other than v j under the global placement P . The gain for node v j under P is defined as follows:
Such a gain definition captures the distance savings when accessing objects from nodes in the group (either the local node or remote ones) instead of the origin server, assumed to be the furthest away.
In the sequel, we define a game that captures the dynamics of distributed object replication under selfishly behaving nodes.
Definition 1 (DSR game) The distributed selfish replication game is defined by the tuple V, {P j }, {G j } , where:
-V is the set of n players, which in this case are the nodes.
-{P j } is the set of strategies available to player v j . As the strategies correspond to placements, player v j has N Cj possible strategies. -{G j } is the set of utilities for the individual players. The utility of player v j under the outcome P , which in this case is a global placement, is G j (P ).
DSR is a n-player, non-cooperative, non-zerosum game [8] . For this game, we seek equilibrium strategies, and in particular, pure Nash equilibrium strategies.
Definition 2 (pure Nash equilibrium for DSR) A pure Nash equilibrium for DSR is a global placement P * , such that for every node v j ∈ V :
That is, under such a placement P * , nodes cannot modify their individual placements unilaterally and benefit. In the sequel, we develop polynomial time algorithms that, given an instance of the DSR game, can produce several Nash equilibrium placement strategies for it.
A Two-Step Local Search Algorithm
In this section we present a two-step local search algorithm that computes a placement for each one of the nodes. In Section 4 we show that these placements correspond to a Nash equilibrium global placement, that is they are EQ strategies. In Section 5, we modify the two-step local search algorithm in order to overcome some of its limitations.
Let P 0 j and P 1 j denote the GL placement strategy and the placement strategy identified by TSLS for node v j , respectively. Let also Greedy j (P) denote a function that computes the optimal placement for node v j , given the set P of distinct objects collectively held by other nodes; we elaborate on this function later on in the section. Table 1 outlines the proposed TSLS algorithm.
At the initialization step (Step 0) nodes compute their GL placements P 0 j . This is done by evaluating Greedy j (∅) for each v j , capturing the case in which nodes operate in isolation (P = ∅).
At the improvement step (Step 1) nodes observe the placements of other nodes and, based on this information, proceed to improve their own. The order in which nodes take turn in improving their initial placements is determined based on their ids (increasing order). Thus at v j 's turn to improve its initial placement, nodes v 1 , . . . , v j−1 have already improved their own, while nodes v j+1 , . . . , v n , have not as yet done so. Node v j obtains its improved placement P 1 j by evaluating Greedy j (P
n denotes the set of distinct objects collectively held by other nodes (hence the −j subscript) at the time prior to v j 's turn at Step 1 (hence the 1 − superscript). We return now to describe how to compute the optimal placement for node v j , when the set of distinct objects collectively held by other nodes is P; such an optimization is employed twice by the TSLS algorithm: at Step 0 where P = ∅, and at Step 1 where P = P 1 − −j . To carry it out, one has to select objects according to their relative excess gain, up to the limit set by the storage capacity of the node. Let g k ij denote the excess gain incurred by node v j from replicating object o i at step k ∈ {0, 1} of TSLS; g k ij depends on v j 's demand for o i and also on whether o i is replicated elsewhere in the group.
r ij · (t s − t l ) is the excess gain for v j from choosing to replicate object o i that is currently not replicated at any node in V . If o i is replicated at some other node(s), then v j 's excess gain of replicating it locally is lower, and equal to r ij · (t r − t l ). Finally, there is no excess gain from choosing to replicate an object that is already replicated locally. Such excess gains are determined by the request frequency for an object, multiplied by the reduction in access cost achieved by fetching the object locally instead from the closest node that currently replicates it (either some other node in V or the origin server). Finding the optimal placement for v j given the objects replicated at other nodes (P) amounts to solving a special case of the 0/1 Knapsack problem, in which object values are given by Eq. (2), object weights are unit, and the Knapsack capacity is equal to an integer value C j . The optimal solution to this problem is obtained by the function Greedy j (P). This function first orders the N objects in a decreasing order according to g k ij (k = 0 at Step 0 and 1 at Step 1), and then it selects for replication at v j the C j most valuable ones.
1 As the objects are of unit size and the capacity is integral, this greedy solution is guaranteed to be an optimal solution to the aforementioned 0/1 Knapsack problem.
We now proceed to connect the 0/
The proof for Proposition 1 and subsequent ones can be found in a longer version of this article [12] .
An important observation is that at the improvement step, a node is allowed to retain its initial GL placement, if this is the placement that maximizes its gain given the placements of other nodes. Thus, the final gain of a node will be at least as high as its GL one, irrespectively of the demand characteristics of other nodes; this eliminates the possibility of mistreatment due to the existence of overactive nodes. Regarding the complexity of TSLS, we show in [12] that it is O(nN log N ).
Existence of a Pure Nash Equilibrium for DSR
In this section it is shown that the global placement (P n ) produced by the TSLS algorithm is a pure Nash equilibrium of the distributed replication game. To prove this result we introduce the following additional definitions. Let
j } denote the eviction set of v j at Step 1; it is a subset of the initial placement, comprising objects that are evicted in favor of new ones during v j 's turn to improve its initial placement. Similarly,
j } denotes the insertion set, i.e., the set of new objects that take the place of the objects that belong to E 1 j . At any point of TSLS an object is dubbed a multiple, if it is replicated in more than one nodes, and an unrepresented one (represented one), if there is no (some) node replicating it. Regarding these categories of objects, we can prove the following:
Proposition 2 (only multiples are evicted) The TSLS algorithm guarantees that the eviction set of node v j is such that E
Proposition 3 (only unrepresented ones are inserted) The TSLS algorithm guarantees that the insertion set of node v j is such that
The previous two propositions enable us to prove that TSLS finds a pure Nash equilibrium for DSR.
Proposition 4
The global placement P 1 = (P 1 1 , P 1 2 , . . . , P 1 n ) produced at the end of Step 1 of the TSLS algorithm is a pure Nash equilibrium for the distributed replication game.
Assuming that no two g k ij are the same, then the maximum number of different equilibria that may be identified by the TSLS algorithm is n!, i.e., a different equilibrium for each possible ordering (permutation) of the n nodes.
At this point we would like to discuss the subtle difference between the DSR game and the TSLS algorithm, which is just a solution for the DSR game, and not an augmented game that also models the ordering of nodes. The DSR game is a well defined game as it is, i.e., without reference to node ordering, or any other concept utilized by the particular TSLS solution. The ordering of nodes is hence just a device for deriving equilibrium placements, and not a concept of the DSR game itself. The ordering of nodes is not required for defining the DSR game.
The use of a specific ordering of nodes in the improvement step of TSLS is central to the algorithm's ability to find equilibrium placements. It might be the case that algorithms of complete information exist that can find equilibrium placements without requiring the use of such a device. For the case of a distributed replication group, however, it seems that some synchronization mechanism, like the ordering of nodes, is required in order to be able to implement a solution algorithm in a distributed manner without requiring complete information (remote utility functions). In [12] we show that by permitting the nodes to improve their placements without coordination with respect to order, they may never reach a stable placement, but instead loop indefinitely through various transient placements.
TSLS(k): Improving on the TSLS Fairness
Consider the case of a homogeneous group, i.e., a group composed of nodes with identical characteristics in terms of capacity, total request rate, and demand distribution. Since such nodes are identical, it is natural to expect that they will be treated equally by a placement strategy. Under the TSLS algorithm, however, the amount of gain that a node receives depends on the node's turn during the improvement step. When the different demand patterns are similar (which is the most interesting case because it allows for higher mutual benefit), then the nodes with the higher turns have an advantage as they can fully utilize the replication decisions of previous nodes [12] 2 . This allows for the possibility that small differences in the "merit quantity" of nodes, based on which the turns are decided (to be defined later on in Sect. 6), will translate into large differences in the assigned node turns. This can lead to an unequal treatment of the individual homogeneous nodes.
To address this issue we propose the TSLS(k) algorithm, which is a variation of the baseline TSLS algorithm. Under TSLS(k), each node may perform only up to k changes during a round of the improvement step, i.e., evict up to k objects to insert an equal number of new ones. Note that under TSLS, any number of changes are permitted during the single round of the improvement step. Under TSLS(k), the improvement step might require multiple rounds to reach an equilibrium placement, whereas under TSLS, an equilibrium placement is reached only after a single round. Intuitively, TSLS(k) works in a round-robin fashion based on some node ordering, and allows each node to perform up to k changes of its current placement during a given round, even if the node would like to perform more changes; for additional changes, the node has to wait for subsequent rounds. The effect of this round-robin, k-constrained selection of objects, is that TSLS(k) is at least as and generally more fair than TSLS with respect to the achieved individual gains. By selecting sufficiently small values of k, e.g., k = 1, which is an extreme case, it is possible to almost eliminate the effect of a node's turn on the amount of gain that it receives under the final placement. Essentially, when k is small, TSLS(k) is able to overcome the inherent limitations with respect to fairness that arise when having to decide a specific node ordering in order to produce an equilibrium placement. For k sufficiently large (approaching the maximum node capacity C max ), TSLS(k) reduces to the baseline TSLS. What the TSLS(k) algorithm provides is essentially a tradeoff between an increased fairness and an increased execution time due to the multiple rounds during the improvement step. In [12] we present the full implementation details of TSLS(k) as well as proofs for its convergence in a finite number of rounds upper bounded by ⌈C max /k⌉.
A Protocol for Applying the Nash Equilibrium for DSR
In this section we outline a protocol for implementing TSLS or TSLS(k) in a distributed replication group.
Deciding Turns for the Improvement Step
First, we describe a simple way for deciding turns that can be used with both TSLS and TSLS(k); for TSLS the ordering has an impact on the individual gains, whereas for TSLS(k) under small k, the ordering has a diminishing effect on the gains. Consider an arbitrary labelling of nodes, not related to the ordering in which nodes take turns. Let T h denote a "merit" quantity associated with node v h , 1 ≤ h ≤ n, based on which v h 's turn is decided. T h will be defined in such a way that larger ids (turns) will be assigned to nodes having larger values T h . At the end, a node whose T h value is the jth largest one, will be re-labelled v j , thus taking the jth turn. There are many ways to define T h for a node; among them the following three are of particular interest because they can be naturally associated with a common case in which nodes have similar demand patterns and where a higher turn is better (see Sect. 7):
The first one caters to proportional fairness. It suggests that a node's turn, or equivalently its share of the extra gain produced through the cooperation, be proportional to the amount of resource (storage capacity) that the node contributes. Under such T h , v j is the jth largest node.
The second definition is a socially inclining one. It favors nodes that generate more requests, as these nodes have the largest influence on the social utility. Under such T h , v j is the jth more active node. Notice that following such a criterion for deciding turns is by no means equivalent to the SO strategy. An equilibrium placement under the pro social benefit criterion favors active nodes by allocating them a bigger share of the extra gain produced through the cooperation; this is to say that all other nodes will have (at least) their GL gain intact, whereas under SO, the benefited nodes may cause other nodes to fall below the GL level of gain.
The third expression for T h is a hybrid way of splitting the gains of the cooperation; it favors nodes that contribute more storage and also produce more requests. Having defined the criterion based on which turns are decided, we move on to defining a protocol for implementing the algorithms and obtaining the equilibrium placement that corresponds to the decided ordering.
Distributed Protocol
A straightforward centralized implementation would require each node to report r j and C j to a central node responsible for executing the TSLS algorithm and sending back the placements P j . The problem with such a centralized architecture is that it requires transmitting n rate vectors r j , with each one containing N (object id, request probability) pairs; for large N this can lead to the consumption of too much bandwidth. We, therefore, turn our attention to the development of the following fully distributed protocol which involves three phases:
Phase DT: During this phase, turns are decided.
1. Each node v h multicasts 3 to the group its value pair (C h , ρ h ), while listening for, and storing, such pairs from other nodes. The truthfulness of the transmitted pair is crosschecked later on by other nodes during the operation of the distributed group. 2. Having listened to n − 1 other value pairs, each node may compute its turn j based on a pre-agreed definition of T h .
Phase 0: In this phase the initial placements according to TSLS are computed and distributed.
1. Each node v j computes its initial placement P 0 j and multicasts it to the group. Taking turns is not required at this phase and nodes may transmit their information concurrently. 2. Nodes listen and store the initial placements of other nodes.
Phase 1: In this phase, the initial placements of TSLS are improved.
1. Node v j waits for its turn (i.e., until v j−1 completes its own turn and transmits) and then computes its improved placement P 3 Native, or end-system, multicast can be employed.
To implement the TSLS(k) algorithm, Phase 1 needs to be repeated until no node has any more changes to perform. As was mentioned earlier, TSLS(k) provides a tradeoff between the improved fairness and the increased time required to perform multiple rounds at Phase 1. The volume of transmitted information, however, is essentially the same as with the baseline TSLS.
The aforementioned protocol has several advantages. It achieves a degree of parallelism, by permitting nodes to compute their initial placements during Phase 0 independently and concurrently with other nodes. Phase 1 involves a distributed computation too, albeit a sequential one. The major advantage, however, relates to the reduction in the amount of transmitted information as compared to a centralized computation which requires the transmission of O(nN ) pairs (object id, request frequency) towards the central point and then O( vj ∈V C j ) object ids sent back from the central point to the nodes carrying the placements P 1 j . Our protocol limits 4 the amount of transmitted information to O( vj ∈V C j ) object ids (initial placements plus eviction and insertion sets). This represents a substantial reduction in the amount of transmitted information, as typically the number of available objects is several orders of magnitude larger than the aggregate storage capacity of the group. Furthermore, lists of object ids can be represented succinctly by employing advanced compression techniques such as Bloom filters [9] , whereas rate vectors composed of (object id, request frequency) elements, are much harder to represent and communicate.
With the above protocol, every node is aware of the placements of the other nodes. This information can be used for request routing as well as a means to detect and reveal untruthful nodes, i.e., nodes that try to exploit the group by declaring false placements (see [12] for details).
Numerical Examples
In this section we present a simple numerical example for the purpose of demonstrating the operation of TSLS and TSLS(k). Assume there exist two nodes that generate requests following the exact same Zipf-like distribution, i.e., r ij = ρ j · K/i a , where
; the skewness parameter a captures the degree of concentration of requests. The local access cost is, t l = 0, the remote one, t r = 1, and the cost of accessing the origin server, t s = 2; this leads to a hop-count notion of distance. Finally, there are N = 100 distinct objects, and each node has a capacity for C = 40 objects.
In Table 2 we show the objects replicated under the GL, SO, and EQ replications strategies for fixed ρ 1 = 1 and varying ρ 2 ; here the EQ strategy is produced by the baseline TSLS. The GL strategy selects for each node the first 40 most popular objects, i.e., those with ids in {1:40}, independently of ρ 2 . The SO strategy, however, is much different. As the request rate from Node 2 increases, SO uses some of the storage capacity of Node 1 for replicating objects that do not fit in Node 2's cache, thereby depriving Node 1 of valuable storage capacity for its own objects. For ρ 2 = 10, Node 1 gets to store only 3 of its most popular objects, while it uses the rest of its v1 -SO
v2 -EQ (TSLS(1)) gain ρ 2 (request rate of v 2 ) Table 2 . An example with v1, v2 having the same Zipf-like demand pattern with a = 0.8. The number of available objects is N = 100 and the storage capacity of each node is C = 40. Also, t l = 0, tr = 1, ts = 2, ρ1 = 1. storage for picking up the next 37 more popular objects for Node 2, starting with the one with id 41. Under the EQ strategy Node 1 (v 1 ) stores 23 of its most popular objects. Node 2 (v 2 ) is the second one (i.e., the last one) to improve its placement, and it naturally selects the initial 40 most popular objects.
We now turn our attention to the gain G j of the two nodes under the various placement strategies (the corresponding access cost can be obtained from the expression t s − G j ). Figure 2 shows that as ρ 2 increases, the gain of v 2 under SO increases as it consumes storage from v 1 for replicating objects according to its preference; v 1 's gain under SO decreases rapidly as a result of not being able to replicate locally some of its most popular objects. In fact, for ρ 2 > 2.5, v 1 's gain becomes worse (lower) that the corresponding one under GL. From this point and onwards, v 1 is being mistreated by the SO strategy and thus has no incentive in participating in it, as it can obviously do better on its own under a GL placement.
By following an EQ strategy, a node's gain is immune to the relative request intensities and this is why the EQ lines are parallel to the x-axis of Fig. 2 . v 1 's gain under the EQ produced by TSLS is immune to the increasing ρ 2 and strictly higher than its gain under GL. This demonstrates the fact that the EQ strategy avoids the mistreatment problem. Under the EQ produced by TSLS both nodes achieve higher gains than with GL, but it is v 2 that benefits the most, and thus incurs a higher gain than v 1 . This owes to the fact that v 2 is the second (last) one to improve its placement and, thus, has an advantage under TSLS. The difference in performance between the two nodes can be eliminated by employing the TSLS(k) algorithm. To show this, Fig. 2 includes the gains of the two nodes under the EQ strategy that is produced by TSLS(1). The corresponding lines almost coincide, which demonstrates the ability of TSLS(k) to be fair and to assign identical gains to v 1 and v 2 (as opposed to TSLS which, in this example, favors v 2 ).
This work has described two algorithms and an efficient distributed protocol for implementing equilibrium object placement strategies in a distributed selfish replication group. Such placement strategies become meaningful when replication nodes cater to their local utilities, as is the case with some content distribution applications that are run under multiple authorities (e.g., P2P, distributed web caching). In such applications, following a socially optimal placement strategy may lead to the mistreatment of some nodes, possibly causing their departure from the group. Our equilibrium strategies on the other hand, guarantee that all nodes are better off participating in the group as opposed to operating in isolation in a greedy local manner. This keeps a distributed group from splitting apart, by creating an excess gain for all (stemming from the cooperation) while forbidding the mistreatment of any one of the nodes. In a longer version of this article, we present several numerical examples for demonstrating the properties of the equilibrium placement strategies.
